Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

10-7-2017

Sweat v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 76 (October
5, 2017)
Shannon Zahm
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Zahm, Shannon, "Sweat v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 76 (October 5, 2017)" (2017).
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. 1094.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/1094

This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

Sweat v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 76 (October 5, 2017)1
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
Summary
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect a defendant from prosecution of any original
charges when the defendant accepts a plea agreement for a lesser-included offense and then fails
to comply with all the terms of the agreement. The Court ultimately determined that a defendant
waives his double jeopardy rights when he pleads guilty and fails to comply with the remaining
terms of the agreement.
Background
On May 9, 2016, the State of Nevada charged Lonnie Sweat with battery constituting
domestic violence—a category C felony. After negotiating a plea agreement with the State to drop
the charge of battery constituting domestic violence, Sweat accepted a plea agreement. Sweat
agreed to plead guilty in justice court to a misdemeanor, and plead guilty in district court to a
felony.
Sweat pleaded guilty in justice court; in district court, however, he refused to plead guilty.
So, the State filed an amended information, which reinstated the battery the original felony battery
charge. Sweat filed a motion to dismiss—that the district court denied—holding that “plea
agreements are subject to contract principles and that Sweat violated the spirit of negotiations by
reneging on the plea agreement.”
Sweat, then, petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition, claiming that
the Double Jeopardy Clause protects him from prosecution for the felony offense in district court.
But the Court disagreed.
Discussion
Sweat’s petition should be entertained
The Court exercised its discretion in granting Sweat’s writ of prohibition because Sweat’s
petition raised an important issue of law. The important issue of law that needed clarification was
“whether a defendant's conviction on a lesser misdemeanor offense in the justice court, as part of
a plea agreement with the State, precludes prosecution on a greater felony offense where the
defendant has withdrawn from the plea agreement with the State.” Therefore, the Court entertained
Sweat’s petition.
The misdemeanor battery constituting domestic violence conviction is a lesser-included offense of
the felony domestic violence charge.
The Double Jeopardy Clause “protects against three abuses: (1) a second prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,
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and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.”2 A second prosecution for the same offense,
at issue here, occurs when the elements of one offense are entirely integrated within the elements
of the second offense.3 The Court found that the misdemeanor battery constituting domestic
violence conviction constitutes a lesser included offense of the felony domestic violence charge
and thus “the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a prosecution for both offenses.”4
Sweat waived his double jeopardy claim by accepting a plea agreement and subsequently failing
to comply with his obligations under the agreement.
Although the Court found that the misdemeanor offense Sweat pleaded guilty to is a lesserincluded offense of the felony charge, the Court held that by Sweat pleading guilty and
subsequently failing to comply with the terms of the agreement, the Double Jeopardy Clause did
not prohibit the State from prosecuting Sweat for the felony.
The United States Supreme Court held in Ricketts v. Adamson that even though a plea
agreement may not explicitly mention the double jeopardy clause or waiver of the double jeopardy
rights under the clause, “the Double Jeopardy Clause does not relieve a defendant from the
consequences of his voluntary choice [to breach the agreement].”5 Under the plea agreement,
Sweat agreed to plead guilty (1) in justice court to a misdemeanor; and (2) in district court to a
felony. But Sweat failed at (2) when he refused to plead guilty to a felony in district court. Thus,
relying on the Supreme Court’s holding in Ricketts, the Nevada Supreme Court reasoned that
Sweat waived his double jeopardy rights when he failed to comply with (2).
Conclusion
A defendant, who voluntarily fails to comply with the terms of a plea agreement, waives
his double jeopardy right to be prosecuted of the original offense.
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Jackson v. State, 128 Nev. 598, 604, 291 P.3d 1274, 1278; see generally U.S. CONST. amend. V;
NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
3
See Estes v. State, 122 Nev. 1123, 1143, 146 P.3d 1114, 1127 (2006) (“To determine the existence
of a lesser-included offense, this court looks to whether the offense in question cannot be
committed without committing the lesser offense.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Barton v. State, 117 Nev. 686, 692, 30 P.3d 1103, 1107 (2001), overruled on other grounds by
Rosas v. State, 122 Nev. 1258, 147 P.3d 1101 (2006).
4
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Estes, 122 Nev. at 1143, 146 P.3d at 1127.
5
Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
See also Dutton v. State, 970 P.2d 925, 932, 935 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (noting that a defendant
may relinquish his double jeopardy rights by his conduct even though the waiver was not
explicitly outlined in the plea agreement); State v. De Nistor, 694 P.2d 237, 242 (Ariz. 1985)
(stating that a defendant waives a double jeopardy defense if after the court accepts the guilty
plea the defendant moves to withdraw his plea, and the withdrawal is granted).
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